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Clark: Critical Analysis of Courts' Approach

FINDING LIKELIHOOD OF
CONFUSION WITH ACTUAL
CONFUSION: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS' APPROACH
I.

INTRODUCTION

Likelihood of confusion is the cornerstone of trademark
infringement. 1 If this likelihood exists, then confusion as to the
source of a good or service probably exists among a substantial number of reasonable buyers. 2 One of the primary purposes of trademark law is to prevent this likelihood from
occurring. 3
1. 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 2:3, 23:1 (2d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter 2 J. MCCARTHY]; See Faruld, Litigation Involving Trademarks: Preparing
the Trademark Case for Trial, 16 U. DAYTON L. REv. 85, 88 (1990) [hereinafter Faruld,
Litigation Involving Trademarks]; See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 717, 728 (1938);
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw, UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 comment b (Tent. Draft No.2,
1991).
2. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note I, §§ 23:1 at 35-36,23:27, at 87-88. This noted commentator observed that determining trademark infringement depends entirely on a
likelihood of confusion in the mind of an appreciable number of "reasonably prudent
buyers." See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 728 comment a (1938); RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAw, UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 comment h (Tent. Draft No.2, 1991). This comment contains the Draft author's definition of the reasonably prudent purchaser: the ordinary
purchaser of the goods or services buying with ordinary care.
3. Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prod. Inc., 930 F.2d 277,291, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d
1417, 1429 (3rd Cir. 1991), cert. denied, _ U.S. _,112 S. Ct. 373 (1991). "Trademark
infringement is established if the plaintiff proves that (1) the marks are valid and legally protectable; (2) the marks are owned by the plaintiff; and (3) the defendant's use
of the marks to identify goods or services is likely to create confusion concerning the
origin of the goods or services."; See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Ins. Co., 657 F.
Supp. 1307, 1313 (M.D. La. 1985), affd, 791 F.2d 929 (1986); See Lanham Act § 2, 15
U.S.C. §l052(d) (1988):
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature
unless it . . .
(d) consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark
registered in the Patent Office or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when applied to the goods of the
applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive ... ;
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Federal courts rely predominantly on the Restatement of
Torts approach when analyzing likelihood of confusion." The
Restatement analysis examines an infringement claim by
applying a scheme of four factors. Thus, courts decide if confusion is likely by critiquing: (1) the degree of similarity
between the competing marks in appearance, pronunciation of
any words used, verbal translation of the pictures or designs
involved, and suggestion; (2) the actor's (i.e. alleged infringer's)
intent in adopting the similar mark; (3) the relation in use and
manner between the goods and services marketed by the actor
and those marketed by the other mark owner; and (4) the
degree of care used by purchasers in relying on or choosing
between similar marks. 6
Federal judges use these factors in various ways. They
have modified the Restatement approach by adding factors to
its scheme. 6 Courts consistently include actual confusion on
Lanham Act § 32,15 U.S.C. § 1114(I)(c) (1988): Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with
the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of ny
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake, or to deceive ...
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the
remedies hereinafter provided.;
Lanham Act § 43, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988);
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word,
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or
any false designation of origin, false or misleading description
offact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person ...
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes
that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.;
S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1274-78 (1946); 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note I,
§ 2:1, at 43. "The interest of the public in not being deceived has been called the basic
policy." (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 137 U.S.P.Q.
413 (S.D.N.Y. 1963».
4. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938).
5.Id.
6. Roto-Rooter Corporation v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45, 186 U.S.P.Q. 73, 74 (5th
Cir. 1975). This court listed seven factors: the type of mark at issue, similarity of design,
similarity of product, identity of retail outlets and purchasers, identity of advertising
media utilized, defendant's intent, and actual confusion.; In Re E.!. Dupont de
Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
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these lists as the only factor which is objective, and not inherently subjective. 7 In addition, jurists caution that the correct
approach to using the schemes is to weigh all factors equally,
to not give greater merit to any factor over another, and to not
expect the factors to reveal likelihood of confusion with· mathematical precision. 8 Other than these caveats, however, courts
give few clues as to how they use the factors to guide their reasoning as to whether confusion is likely or unlikely.9
This case collected a comprehensive scheme of thirteen factors: similarity of marks,
similarity of goods, trade channels, buyers and conditions of sale, fame of prior mark,
third party uses, actual confusion vel non, length of concurrent use without confusion,
variety of goods on which mark is used, market interface between parties, exclusivity of right of applicant, extent of potential confusion, and other probative facts.;
Polaroid v. Polarad, 287 F.2d 492, 128 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 411 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 268 U.S. 820 (1961). This seminal decision used a list of eight factors: the
strength of the senior user's mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks,
the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap,
actual confusion, the defendant's good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of
defendant's product, and the sophistication of the buyers.; See Kirkpatrick, Likelihood
of Confusion Issues: The Federal Circuit's Standard of Review, 40 AM. U.L. REV 1221,
1222 n.3 (1991) ("[G]enerally the courts consider, at a minimum: (I) the strength of
the plaintiffs mark; (2) the similarity of the parties' respective marks; (3) the similarities of the products or services; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) degree of purchaser care; and (6) the defendant's intent .•).
7. See supra note 6. The subjective character of the other "likelihood factors·
results from the lack of a method or standard that measures whether they are satisfied. For instance, no recognized means exists to test whether two marks are similar
in sound or appearance, whether a senior user is likely to bridge the gap in markets
used to sell two products, how similar products are, the quality of products, or the
sophistication of buyers.
Some factors seem to be better suited for assessing facets of trademark infringement other than likelihood of confusion. For example, the strength of a mark raises the
issue of the degree of protection that a user will receive, not the issue of whether protection needs to be given. See Berkshire Fashions, Inc. V. Sara Lee Corp., 725 F. Supp.
790, 795, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1124, 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), amend. denied, 729 F. Supp.
221, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 904 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1990); See also
McGregor-Doniger Inc. V. Drizzle Inc., 599 F. 2d 1126, 1131-32,202 U.S.P.Q. 81, 8889 (2d Cir. 1979), affg., 446 F. Supp. 160, 161, 199 U.S.P.Q. 466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
A junior user's intent or good faith in adopting a mark is the only other factor suggested by case law as capable standing alone of being dispositive of the confusion issue.
See Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Marketing Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1111,
18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1596 (6th Cir. 1991). Other decisions have held that at best it raises a presumption of confusion. See Squirtco V. The Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091,
207 U.S.P.Q. 897,900 (8th Cir. 1980), affg in part and vacating in part, Squirt CO. V.
The Seven-Up Co., 480 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Dreyfus Fund V. Royal Bank of
Canada, 525 F. Supp. il08, 1121,213 U.S.P.Q. 872, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
8. Homeowners Group, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1107, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1592
(6th Cir. 1991); Ambrit, Inc. V. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1538, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161,
1166·67 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); In re Application ofE. I.
DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361-62, 177 U.S.P.Q. 563, 567 (C.C.P.A.
1973); See also 3A R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARK, & MONOPOLIES §
20.07, at 32 (4th ed. 1988) [hereinafter 3A R. CALLMAN].
9. One leading commentator noted that the nature of any likelihood of confusion
decision "lends itself to the judicial 'hunch' and that legal reasoning is after the fact
of the decision.- 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note I, § 23:26, at 84·85.
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This comment asserts that federal courts do not decide
the likelihood of confusion issue by using these theories.
Instead, the typical likelihood of confusion dispute is decided
by giving actual confusion more weight than other analytical
elements, despite courts' claims that they give the elements
equal weight and consideration. 10
It is time for courts to recognize explicitly this shift in the
law. This article presents four justifications for doing SO.l1
First, the strongest arguments against giving more weight to
actual confusion are meritless. 12 Second, the rule is settled
that actual confusion is the best evidence of a likelihood of confusion. 13 Third, courts rely on actual confusion already and are
10. The argument that actual confusion is emphasized is distinguishable from
a previous commentator's suggestion that actual confusion should replace likelihood
of confusion as the standard by which an interest in marks is measured. Cf. Note,
Confusing Similarities in Trademarks: A Suggested Approach, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 470
(1970). The most recent revision of federal trademark law ignored this latter suggestion.
See Comment, What is the Impact of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 19887,16 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 129 (1990) (authored by Todd B. Carver).
11. Trademark law is characterized in part by slow yet constant alteration. See
generally McCarthy, Important Trends in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law
During the Decade of the 1970s, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 93 (1981) [hereinafter McCarthy,
Important Trends].
A reform of the process by which likelihood of confusion is found will be consistent with other modem changes in trademark law. Common law trademarks protected
the public's interest in being free from deception. Later developments brought the mark
holder's property interests in a trademark within the ambit of trademark protection.
More recently, the policy of encouraging competition has been used to support wider
trademark protection. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp 670, 69495, 137 U.S.P.Q. 413, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See also 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§
2:1,2:4-2:14; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw, UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 comment b (Tent.
Draft No.2 1991).
The kind of confusion looked for in infringement actions has evolved from confusion of source to confusion of sponsorship and quality assurance. See Triangle
Publications v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 972 (2d Cir. 1948); See infra pp. 10-13 & notes
26-37; 2 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, §l:03.
In addition, the person experiencing confusion has also changed. Originally, only
the consumer's confusion could be considered; but now confusion among third parties
who may see the senior mark holder's goods in use after the sale and outside the marketplace and persons familiar with the industry in which the trademarked item or service is sold also can be taken into account. Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss
& Co., 631 F. Supp. 735, 746; 228 U.S.P.Q. 648, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 799 F.2d 867,
871,230 U.S.P.Q. 831, 835 (2d Cir. 1986); See World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick'LittreU's New
World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 487-88, 168 U.S.P.Q. 609,614 (5th Cir. 1971).
One long standing dispute that is now settled concerned the question of whether
the determination of likelihood of confusion was one oflaw or one of fact and what the
standard of appellate review should be. The federal circuits currently lean heavily
toward treating likelihood of confusion as Ii question offaet subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review. See generally Kirkpatrick, Likelihood of Confusion Issues:
The Federal Circuit's Standard of Review, 40 AM. U.L. REV. 1221, 1223-24 (1991).
12. See infra text pp. 8-10 & accompanying notes 18-25.
.
13. See infra text pp. 10-23 & accompanying notes 26-75.
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satisfied that it exists even if only a low quantity of actual confusion is proven. 14 Lastly, trademark law is becoming an independent field of law and the judicial glosses on key trademark
statutes have increased the importance of actual confusion in
infringement decisions. 16
The benefits of relying on actual confusion justify courts
being explicit about using it as the paramount element of
their analysis. Legal reasoning will be grounded thereby in an
objective basis for finding likelihood of confusion. Also, a
court's inquiry will be narrowed to marketplace confusion,
the harm that trademark law seeks to prevent. 18 Additionally,
trademark applicants, users, and litigators will have notice of
what to avoid in preparing a mark for use, and what to emphasize in preparing for trial. 17

II. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST EMPHASIZING ACTUAL
CONFUSION
Traditionally, two arguments prevented actual confusion
from carrying more weight in proving the existence of a likelihood of confusion. First, most authorities agreed that actual consumer confusion is hard to find. IS Second, a general
consensus held that emphasizing actual confusion requires
senior users to suffer irreparable harm while trying to uncover evidence of actual confusion before bringing legal action
against a party using a similar mark. 19
The first objection is without foundation because even if evidence of actual confusion could not be obtained in the past, it
appears in modern case law in a number of forxp.s. A number
14. See infra text pp. 23·30 & accompanying notes 74·96.
15. See infra text pp. 30·31 & accompanying notes 94·102.
16. See supra note 3.
17. Faruki, Litigation Involving Trademarks, supra note 1.
18. Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, 360 F.2d 609, 612, 146 U.S.P.Q. 666, 668
(7th Cir. 1966). "[S]ince reliable evidence of actual confusion is difficult to obtain in
trademark... cases, any such evidence is substantial evidence oClikelihood of confusion.";
See Harold F. Ritchie, Inc., v. Chesebrough·Pond's Inc., 281 F.2d 766,761 (2d Cir. 1968)
("[R]eliable evidence of actual instances of confusion is practically almost impossible
to secure." (citation omitted», rev'll, 176 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); See Chester
Barrie, Ltd. v. Chester Laurie, Ltd, 180 F. Supp. 98, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (-[O]rdinarily
evidence of actual confusion is difficult to secure... "); See 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 8,
§ 20.06; E. VANDENBURGH, TRADEMARK LAw AND PROCEDURE § 6.62 (2d ed. 1979); 2 J.
MCCARTHY, supra note I, § 23:2. See also Faruki, Litigation Involving Trademarks,
supra n. I, at 114. See also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw, UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 com·
ment g (Tent. Draft No.2, 1991).
19. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note I, § 23:2; See 3A R. CALLMAN, supra note 8, § 20.06.
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of cases report offers of proof of actual confusion with anecdotal
evidence,20 surveys of reasonably prudent buyers in the marketplace,21 and a combination of anecdotes and surveys.22
The second objection is weakened by two considerations.
First, equitable relief protects mark holders from having to suffer such harm. 23 Second, irreparable harm is at issue only if
actual confusion is required. 24 Where actual confusion is emphasized but not required in finding likelihood of confusion, a
court's critique of the other likelihood of confusion elements still
can provide a basis for equitable relief if actual confusion is
absent. 25
Thus it appears that the rationales for refusing to give
actual confusion more weight are either untenable or avoidable.
The result is that the argument against emphasizing actual
confusion is weakened and the case that it is the primary tool
for showing likelihood of confusion is strengthened.

III.

THE BEST EVIDENCE OF LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Defeating the strongest objections to giving actual confusion more weight helps establish that such confusion is used
modernly as the dispositive factor in infringement analysis.
Further support comes from the settled rule that actual
20. Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d ll61 (llth Cir.
1986) (consumers confused), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Armco, Inc. v. Armco
Burglar Alarm Co., Inc., 693 F.2d ll55, ll60, 217 U.S.P.Q. 145, 149 (5th Cir. 1982)
(consumer confusion); Roto-Rooter Corporation v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 46, 186
U.S.P;Q. 73, 74 (5th Cir. 1975) (consumers confused); World Carpets Inc. v. Dick
Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 484, 168 U.S.P.Q. 609, 6ll (5th Cir. 1971)
(retailers confused); Spangler Candy Company v. Crystal Pure Candy Company, 353
F.2d 641, 643-44, 147 U.S.P.Q. 434, 436 (7th Cir. 1966) (consumer confused); Dr. Ing.
h.c.F. Porsche AG v. Zim, 481 F. Supp 1247, 1249,208 U.S.P.Q. 440, 442 (N.D. Tex.
1979) (consumers, suppliers confused); Chester Barrie, Ltd. v. Chester Laurie, Ltd.,
189 F. Supp. 98, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (customers and an advertiser confused).
21. See generally Annotation, Admissibility and Weight of Consumer Survey in
Litigation Under Trademark Opposition, Trademark Infringement, and False
Designation of Origin Provisions of Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1063, 1114, and
1125), 98 A.L.R. FED. 20 (1990) [hereinafter Annotation, Admissibility J.
22. See Jockey International, Inc. v. Burkard, 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 201, 205
(S.D. Cal. 1975).
23. PPX Enterprises v. Audio Fidelity Enterprises, 818 F.2d 266, 271, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d 1672, 1675 (2d Cir. 1987); Dreyfus Fund Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 525
F. Supp. ll08, llll, 213 U.S.P.Q. 872, 874 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); See also Resource
Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Foundation, Inc., 926 F.2d 134,
139,17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1842, 1845 (2nd Cir. 1991).
24. PPX Enterprises, 818 F.2d at 271, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1675-76.
25. See Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria SerraHes, Inc., 921 F.2d 467,
475,17 U.S.P.Q.2d ll04, 1110 (3d. Cir. 1990).
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confusion is the best eyidence of likelihood of confusion. This
rule can be traced to Judge Jerome Frank's dissent in Triangle
Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich. 26
In Triangle Publications a magazine publisher began designating its publication with the title of "Seventeen." In
January 1945 it registered this mark with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, thereby protecting its property rights in the
mark to the greatest extent possible. 27 Rohrlich, a manufacturer
of women's undergarments, began using "Miss Seventeen" to
designate its product in June 1945. 28 Triangle Publications
sued on the theory that concurrent use of the marks would likely cause consumer confusion and that Rohrlich should be liable
for such confusion.
The majority held that Rohrlich's use of its mark would create a risk that Triangle Publication's customers might think
that Triangle made or sponsored Rohrlich's product. 29 In effect
the public associated the common symbol "Seventeen" so closely with Triangle's product that any other use of it would be credited to Triangle Publications. 30 In fact, the same situation
would have arisen if Triangle Publications published "Youth"
magazine and Rohrlich manufactured and sold "Youth
Girdles".31 If use of the infringing product disappointed a
Triangle Publication customer, and she associated the product
with Triangle Publications because of its similar trademark, her
association implicates trademark law concerns regarding
marketplace confusion. 32
Judge Frank's dissent attacked this characterization of
the mark. He asserted that Triangle Publications had not
made "Seventeen" descriptive of its interests alone, thus no
probability of confusion between Rohrlich's product and
26. 167 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1948).
27. Id. at 970; See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1988); See generally McCarthy, Important
Trends, supra note 11, at 101-06 (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531
F.2d 366, 188 U.S.P.Q. 623 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976».
28. 167 F.2d at 970.
29. Id. at 972-73.
30. A common term has "secondary meaning" when it is identified by consumers
with a producer, its goods, or its services. This concept is crucial to providing protection to marks which merely describe the qualities or characteristics of a product or service, or one that is unregistered. If this link is not made by consumers, the mark is not
protectable. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Ins. Co., 657 F. Supp 1307, 1314 (M.D.
La. 1985), affd, 791 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1986); See also 15 U.S.C. §1125(a)(1) (1988).
31. Triangle Publications, 167 F.2d at 975.
32.Id.
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Triangle's magazine could exist. 33 He then stated: "Of course,
that conclusion would have to yield, were there here a finding,
supported by evidence, of actual confusion or clear evidence that
it is likely. "34 This statement signals the beginning of the shift
in the law toward accepting actual confusion as the best evidence of likelihood of confusion.
Judge Frank believed that absent a finding that actual
confusion exists, judges could only guess at what is "likely."36
This is especially true where the judge is not a member of the
buying public to whom the competing mark is sold. Frank
noted that in the Triangle Publications litigation, "neither
the trial judge nor any member of this court is (or resembles)
a teen-age girl or the mother or the sister of such a girl."36 He
believed that absent guidance as to how young women react
when confronted with the competing marks, the courts are not
fully informed on whether a reasonable person would be confused as to the source or sponsorship of Rohrlich's girdles ifit
used the applied-for trademark. s7
Judge Frank's dissent started a trend, but did not cause
. sudden adoption of actual confusion as the best evidence of a
likelihood of confusion. Standard Oil Company v. Standard Oil
Company illustrates how Frank's view gained acceptance only
within the context of the Restatement of Tort's emphasis on the
subjective elements that go toward showing confusion is
probable. S8
The Standard case arose from the 1911 court ordered dissolution of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. Many
entities owned and used the name "Standard Oil" in various
combinations, with exclusive rights to the phrase within geographically defined areas.S9
33. rd. at 975. Frank also attacked the majority's approach that the Triangle
Publication mark had acquired secondary meaning. He noted that the characterization was sound only if the mark indeed was "descriptive- and not "fanciful· or "symbolic·. Frank interpreted the plaintiffs testimony that they titled their magazine
"Seventeen" because it had acquired a popular descriptive meaning for an age group
and its outlook on life as proof that no secondary meaning could attach to the word
"Seventeen.· rd. He also held that even if secondary meaning existed the goods were
so dissimilar that no probability of confusion could arise. rd.
34. Id. at 976.
35.Id.
36. Id. at 975.
37. rd. at 976.
38. 252 F.2d 65 (lOth Oir. 1958), affg, 141 F. Supp. 876 (D. Wyo. 1956).
39. Id. at 68-69.
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In Standard, an Indiana corporation which owned and
used "Standard Oil" as a trademark in fifteen states sued an
Ohio corporation which owned the exclqsive right to use
"Standard" in Ohio.~ Standard of Indiana brought its action
when Standard of Ohio began selling gasoline and oil products,
marked "SOHIO," in one of Standard of Indiana's states of
exclusive use. The trial court held that this infringed upon
Standard of Indiana's interests and enjoined Standard of Ohio
from using "SOHIO" in Standard of Indiana's territory.41
The Standard court proclaimed that "[t]here can be no
more positive proof of likelihood of confusion than evidence of
actual confusion," and held that the record led to "a fair and reasonable inference" that confusion existed. 42 However, it rigidly
followed the Restatement of Torts and grounded its decision in
the subjective factors of (1) the degree of similarity in appearance, sound and meaning between the marks; (2) the intent of
the defendants in adopting and using the term "SOHIO;" and
(3) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers. 43
The Standard court ignored its own view that the best
way to show confusion is likely is to show that confusion exists.
Thus, it initiated what would become a pattern in infringement
cases: courts acknowledge the probative weight of actual con-·
fusion, but refuse to admit explicitly that this element alone
could establish that likelihood of confusion exists.

Plough, Inc. u. Kreis Laboratories perpetuated the Standard
approach.'4 In·Plough, the Ninth Circuit noted that " ... one of
the better ways to prove likelihood of confusion in the future
is to prove it existed in the past. "46 The court also cited the
Restatement of Torts test to determine whether a probability
of confusion exists: appearance, pronunciation and verbal
translation. 48
However, Plough used the Restatement factors in a slightly new fashion. It included the usual element of actual
40. 1d. at 69.
41. 1d.
42. 1d. at 74.
43. 1d. at 72.
44. 314 F.2d 635, 136 U.S.P.Q. 560 (9th Cir. 1963).
45. 1d. at 639, 641, 136 U.S.P.Q. at 563, 564. Plough does contain the caveat that
actual confusion is not a requirement for infringement nor the standard by which to
measure infringement. Instead, the settled standard ofproofis a likelihood of confusion.
46. 1d. at 638, 136 U.S.P.Q. at 562 (Citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938».
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confusion, and then added a "wild card" factor that could
include a second analysis of whether consumers experienced
confusion. 47 Thus the court asked Plough, Inc. to show proof of
(1) confusion of even one person in the marketplace; (2) similarity in packaging; (3) similarity in sound of the names of the
products; (4) exact copying; or (5) any effect upon prospective
customers (emphasis added).48 Plough, Inc. failed to carry this
burden and therefore failed to show any similarity that "would
cause confusion of any appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers as to the source of the goods."49
By listing actual confusion as the first element in a scheme
offive, and by using the general language of "any effect" in the
fifth element, Plough implicitly emphasized actual confusion
more than previous courts. The lone dissenting judge in Plough
noted this shift, and the fact that it occurred within the context of a concession to the Restatement approach. 60
In fact, Plough's analysis depended on the Restatement of
Torts approach to the same extent as did the reasoning in
Standard and Triangle Publications. Plough did not state
clearly that if evidence of actual confusion had been presented, it would have been given greater deference than other elements of likelihood of confusion. Moreover, Plough did not
suggest that actual confusion standing alone could prove the
existence of likelihood of confusion.
The 1965 decision in Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn,
Inc. 61 again perpetuated the approach developed by Standard
and Plough. In Tisch, the plaintiffs owned and operated three
luxury hotels (all called "Americana") in Florida, New York,
and Puerto Rico. The defendants also engaged in the tourist
business with two motels in Chicago, the "Americana Motel"
and the "Americana Inn. "62 Tisch Hotels registered their
mark, filed suit against Americana for trademark infringement, presented proof of actual confusion, but lost at the
trial level. 63
47. 1d. at 640,136 U.S.P.Q. at 564.
48.1d.
49. 1d. at 641, 136 U.S.P.Q. at 564.
50. 1d. at 648, 136 U.S.P.Q. at 567 (Pope, J., dissenting).
51. 350 F.2d 609, 146 U.S.P.Q. 566 (7th Cir. 1965).
52. 1d. at 610, 146 U.S.P.Q. at 567.
53. 1d. at 610-11, 146 U.S.P.Q at 567-68.
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The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that actual confusion
is "substantial evidence of likelihood of confusion",M while
warning against emphasizing actual confusion. 66 Thus Tisch,
like Standard and Plough, moved trademark law closer to
accepting actual confusion as the most probative element in
trademark analysis but expressed reservations about explicitly acknowledging that it filled this purpose.

World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World Carpets 66
brought trademark law closer to relying on proof of actual
confusion ,to establish a likelihood of confusion. World Carpets
gave further support to the proposition that "[t]here can be no
more positive or substantial proof of the likelihood of confusion
than proof of actual confusion. "67 World Carpets strengthened
the doctrine by noting that "[ w ]hile very little proof of actual
confusion would be necessary to prove the likelihood of confusion, an almost overwhelming amount of proof would be
necessary to refute such proof. "68
Thus, when Dick Littrell's failed to produce evidence to
refute World Carpet's proffered instances of actual confusion,
the court held that "[t]he evidence pointed so strongly in favor
of a finding of confusion that the minds of reasonable men could
not have arrived at a contrary decision. "69 The Fifth Circuit
therefore upheld the trial court's directed verdict in favor of
World Carpets. 60
. In Roto-Rooter Corporation v. O'Neal 81 the Fifth Circuit
reaffirmed its holding in World Carpets that "[actual confusion]
54. Id. at 611-12, 146 U.S.P.Q. at 568. The Tisch court noted this was so even
though likelihood of confusion can be proven without a showing of actual confusion.
See also Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 281 F.2d 755, 761 (2d Cir.
1960) ("Actual confusion or deception of purchasers is not essential to a finding of trademark infringement ... [b]ut where such proof is adduced, weight should be given it."),
rev'g., 176 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y 1959).
55. Tisch Hotels, 350 F.2d at 611 n.4, 146 U.S.P.Q. at 568 n.4.
56. 438 F.2d 482, 168 U.S.P.Q. 609 (5th Cir. 1971).
57. Id. at 489,168 U.S.P.Q. at 615. See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg
Nachfv. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707,715-16,180 U.S.P.Q. 506, 512 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) ("[T]here can be no more positive proof of likelihood of confusion than evidence of actual confusion"), modified on other grounds, 523 F.2d 1331, 1340, 186
U.S.P.Q. 436, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1975); United States Jaycees v. San Francisco Junior
Chamber of Commerce, 354 F. Supp. 61, 77,175 U.S.P.Q. 525, 537 (N.D. Cal. 1972)
("[E]vidence of actual confusion is extremely significant to a determination of the likelihood of confusion."), affd, 513 F.2d 1226, 185 U.S.P.Q. 257 (9th Cir. 1975).
58. World Carpets, 438 F.2d at 489, 168 U.S.P.Q. at 615.
59.Id.
60.Id.
61. 513 F.2d 44, 186 U.S.P.Q. 73 (5th Cir. 1975).
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is the best evidence of likelihood of confusion. "62 Roto-Rooter
presented four instances of persons who intended to hire
RotoRooter but hired O'Neal instead. Each of these people
confused the defendant with Roto-Rooter because O'Neal used
a tradename similar to Roto-Rooter's. In the court's opinion,
this raised the type of consumer confusion that trademark
law tries to prevent. 63
Two of the most recent expositions of the idea that actual
confusion is the best indicator that a likelihood of confusion
exists or will exist are Sateway Stores, Inc. v. Sateway
Insurance Company64 and Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. Sara
Lee Corp.66

Sateway strongly supported the idea that actual confusion
is paramount when evaluating the likelihood of confusion. It
stated that "a sufficient demonstration of actual confusion
could sustain a finding of the likelihood of confusion even in the
absence of other proof."66 Sateway's endorsement of actual confusion is tempered, however, by the court's reliance on a nine
element scheme to determine whether confusion was likely.67
The Sateway court also held that none of the factors is dispositive, in contradiction to its assertion that actual confusion
standing alone could prove the existence of a likelihood of confusion. 66 The court in Sateway not only contradicts itself, but it
analyzed six of the nine elements in its scheme before looking
for evidence of actual confusion, thereby affirming its loyalty to
the Restatement approach to likelihood of confusion. 69
62. Id. at 45·46, 186 U.S.P.Q. at 74.
63. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 supra, note 3.
64. 657 F. Supp. 1307 (M.D. La. 1985), affd, 791 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1986).
65. 725 F. Supp. 790, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), amend. denied, 729
F. Supp. 21, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 904 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1990).
66. Safeway Stores, 657 F. Supp. at 1316. See also Falcon Rice Mill v. Community
Rice Mill, 725 F.2d 336, 345, 222 U.S.P.Q. 197,203 (5th Cir. 1984); Frisch's Restaurants
v. Elby's Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642, 648 n.5, 214 U.S.P.Q. 15,20 n.5 (6th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982); Chevron Chemical Company v. Voluntary Purchasing
Groups, 659 F.2d 695, 704, 212 U.S.P.Q. 904,913 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1126 (1982).
67. Safeway Stores, 657 F. Supp. at 1313. Safeway's list of confusion factors
included (1) the type of trademark alleged to have been infringed; (2) the similarity of
design between the two marks; (3) similarity of the products or services; (4) the iden·
tity of the retail outlets and purchasers; (5) the identity of the advertising medium uti·
lized; (6) the defendant's intent; (7) evidence of actual confusion; (8) degree of care
exercised by purchasers; and (9) diversity of products or services offered by the parties.
68.Id.
69. Id. at 1316·18.
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In Berkshire, the court again listed a number of elements
that can be examined, listing actual confusion fifth. However,
Berkshire also noted that actual confusion is difficult to uncover, thus concluding that proof of actual confusion is not necessary for a finding of potential confusion. 70 The court then
noted that instances of confusion among trades people in a profession "is highly probative" on the issue of whether a likelihood
of confusion exists "since wholesalers and retail dealers may
be deemed to be more sophisticated about the origins and
sources of product lines than average consumers." (Citations
omitted).71
Neither the Berkshire nor Safeway decisions openly gave
actual confusion the weight that they claimed it deserved.
Both courts examined each element (i.e. strength of senior
user's mark, degree of similarity between the marks, the proximity in the marketplace of the products, etc.) before examining the best evidence of likelihood of confusion actual confusion. 72
In Safeway, no actual confusion was found, thus a possibility exists that the inquiry need have gone no further. In
Berkshire, anecdotes of customers being confused by the similar marks and an admissible, methodologically correct survey
by the senior user (balanced against a less reliable survey by
the defendant) showed a statistically significant amount of customer confusion. 73 Thus the Berkshire court could have begun
its inquiry by looking first to the offer of proof on the existence
of actual confusion. Mter ascertaining whether marketplace
confusion existed, the case could have been decided in favor of
the senior user.
Yet the Berkshire court clung to past practices and made
four subjective inquiries before it analyzed and weighed the evidence of actual confusion. 74 This approach is the legacy of
courts assuming that actual confusion was hard to find and
prove, and relying on the Restatement of Torts approach to
trademark infringement. 76
.
70. Berkshire Fashions, 725 F. Supp. at 796,14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1129.
71. Id. at 796-97,14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1129.
72. Id. at 795, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1128; See Safeway Stores, 657 F. Supp. at 1313.
73. Berkshire Fashions, 725 F. Supp. at 797-98, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1130.
74. Id. at 795-97,14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1128-29.
75. Id. at 794, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1128. Berkshire looked back to an earlier
infringement decision and used the earlier cases's elements which it developed directly from the Restatement. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492,
495 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U;S. 820 (1961).
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The cases from Triangle Publications to Berkshire trace the
development of tension between theory and practice in this area
of trademark law. In theory, a multitude of elements, all of
equal weight, are examined to find a likelihood of confusion. In
practice, actual confusion is accepted as the best evidence of
likelihood of confusion, but courts are reluctant to admit that
they use it as a dispositive element. Instead, they maintain that
"actual confusion is hard to find" and resort to the Restatement
of Torts for guidance.

IV. COURT'S RELIANCE ON EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL
CONFUSION
Thus far, two justifications have been advanced for expressly acknowledging that courts give more probative value to
actual confusion than to other elements which show likelihood of confusion. First, the strongest objections to giving
actual confusion a larger role are without foundation. Second,
the idea that actual confusion is the best evidence of a likelihood of confusion has been accepted in the case law. A third
rationale lies in the fact that courts rely on actual confusion
already. They allow a small quantity of proof of actual confusion to satisfy the inquiry about its existence, and use anecdotes, surveys, and even the absence of actual confusion to
assess the probability that a likelihood of confusion exists.
A.

ANECDOTAL CASES

There is no bright line or absolute number of incidents of
actual confusion that can establish actual confusion's existence. 78 Instead, actual confusion is evaluated "[i]n the light of
the circumstances involved. "77 Homeowners Group, Inc. v.
Home Marketing Specialists, Inc. held that "[p]erhaps as
important as the number of instances of confusion are the
kinds of persons confused and degree of confusion. "78
76. Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531,1543,1 U.S.P.Q.2d ll61, ll71 (llth
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
77.1d.
78. 931 F.2d 1100, lll0, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1595 (6th Cir. 1991). In Homeowners, the evidence of actual confusion consisted of deposition testimony from
Homeowners' national marketing director that he knew of instances of confusion by
real estate customers and a letter from a real estate broker.; See Safeway Stores, Inc.
v. Safeway Discount Drugs, 675 F.2d ll60, ll67, 216 U.S.P.Q. 599, 604 (llth Cir. 1982).
·Perhaps as important as, and helping to explain the various interpretations of the
relevance of. the number of instances of confusion are the kinds of persons confused
and degree of confusion. Short-lived confusion or confusion of individuals casually
acquainted with a business is worthy of little weight, while confusion of actual customers of a business is worthy of substantial weight.· (Citation omitted).
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In Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., the court held that Ambrit
established actual confusion by presenting only four instances
of customer confusion. 79 These customers complained to Ambrit
that they mistakenly purchased a competitor's product because
its similar label confused them. 80 These otherwise isolated
instances carried considerable weight because the customers
purchased relatively inexpensive items from alarge corporation. According to the Ambrit court, most customers do not take
the time to complain in similar situations, so any such complaint is given great deference in spite of being an isolated incident among many similar purchases. 81

Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., Inc. 82 also used
anecdotes of actual confusion as an important tool in finding
trademark infringement. In Armco, a steel manufacturer
sought to enjoin the use of the "Armco" name in a burglar
and fire alarm business. 83 Mer trying to negotiate a settlement,
the manufacturer filed suit seeking damages and injunctive
relief under 15 U.S.C. § 1114.84
The steel manufacturer presented evidence that its employees had received phone calls, over an extended period of time,
from people trying to contact the alarm company/defendant.
These consumers had become confused when relying on the similarity between the two marks. 85 Additionally, one of the steel
manufacturer's employees testified that two friends had asked,
based on their knowledge of the existence of defendant's mark,
"When did y'all get into the burglar alarm business?"86
79. 812 F.2d 1531, 1544, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1171-72 (11th Cir. 1986).
80.Id.
81. Id. See also Jellibean8, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Georgia, Inc., 715 F.2d 833,
844,222 U.S.P.Q.2d 10, 19-20 (11th Cir. 1983) (few incidents of actual confusion establish its existence); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, 675 F.2d 1160, 1167,
216 U.S.P.Q. 599, 604 (11th Cir. 1982) (one misdirected letter from a creditor and one
misdirected customer inquiry established actual confusion); Compare Sun Banks of
Florida v. Sun Federal Savings & Loan, 651 F.2d 311, 319, 211 U.S.P.Q. 844, 851 (5th
Cir. 1981) (nineteen instances of confusion do not establish actual confusion) and
Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263, 205 U.S.P.Q. 969, 978-79 (5th
Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 614 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899
(1980) (two verbal inquiries as to whether two mark holders were related to, each other
and one misdirected letter do not establish actual confusion and are insufficient to sustain a finding of likelihood of confusion).
82. 693 F.2d 1155, 217 U.S.P.Q. 145 (5th Cir. 1982).
83. Id. at 1156, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 146-47.
84. Id. at 1158, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 147.
85. Id. at 1160, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 149.
86. Id. at 1160, nn.l0-12, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 149, nn.l0-12.
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Again, the quantity of confusion is low. But in Armco, as in
Homeowners and Ambrit, a few instances of actual confusion
constituted sufficient proof of likelihood of confusion. Where
this probability is established, trademark concerns are implicated and a plaintiff is entitled to relief. 87
Two implications flow from great probative weight being
given to a small quantity of evidence of actual confusion. First,
actual confusion should be given greater weight than other factors balanced by most courts when ascertaining likelihood of
confusion. Second, courts can justify their emphasis on actual confusion without disturbing traditional trademark protections.
B.

SURVEY CASES

The use of surveys in infringement actions also shows that a
statistically low level of actual confusion is sufficient to establish
actual confusion. 88 Judicial acceptance and trust of surveys grew
as poll takers refined and improved the discipline of conducting
public opinion surveys.89 Surveys are an integral part of modern
trademark infringement litigation, and failure to conduct one can
lead to an inference that likelihood of confusion does not exist. 90
Surveys are now easily admitted into evidence in trademark
litigation so long as a proper foundation is established. 91
87. Id. at 1161, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 150. See Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d
44,46, 186 U.S.P.Q. 73, 74 (5th Cir. 1975) (four incidents of confusion are sufficient
to satisfy existence of actual confusion); Spangler Candy Company v. Crystal Pure
Candy Company, 353 F.2d 641, 647,147 U.S.P.Q. 434, 439 (7th Cir. 1965) (five independent incidents of confusion establish actual confusion; incidents impeached by showing bias thus diminishing their wieght); Chester Barrie, Ltd. v. Chester Laurie, Ltd.,
189 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (two incidents of customers approaching plaintiffs
salesmen with questions regarding defendant's product combined with an inquiry from
an advertiser who also confused the two labels proved actual confusion existed).
88. See generally Evans and Gunn, Trademark Survey Evidence, 20 TEx. TECH
L. REV. 1,3 (1989) [hereinafter Evans & Gunnl; Annotation, Admissibility, supra note
21; Faruki, Litigation Involving Trademarks, supra note I, at 114-17.
89. Evans and Gunn, supra note 88, at 9-10. See also Standard Oil Co. v.
Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65 (lOth Cir. 1958); United States v. Eighty-eight Cases,
More or Less, Containing Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967 (3rd Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670,
137 U.S.P.Q. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
90. E. S. Originals Inc. v. Stride Rite Corporation, 656 F. Supp. 484, 490, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d 1934, 1939 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
91. See Amstar Corporation v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263, 205
U.S.P.Q. 969, 979 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 617 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980). (defendant's survey rejected as contrived and plaintiffs
for being conducted improperly); Toys R Us, Inc. v. Camasie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559
F. Supp. 1189, 1201-05,217 U.S.P.Q. 1137, 1144, 1147-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (survey
rejected); See generally Faruki, Litigation Involving Trademarks, supra n. I, at
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Some courts have held that survey results showing a very
low percentage of actual confusion among respondents to the
survey is proof of actual confusion. 92 Such an approach can be
attributed to the idea that actual confusion, no matter how
slight, is the best evidence of a likelihood of confusion.
.
The low percentage of actual confusion that a survey needs
to prove carries the same implications as the high probative
value given to small quantities of anecdotal evidence of actual confusion. Where it is found, actual confusion is highly probative of likelihood of confusion and almost impossible to
refute. Thus, actual confusion deserves to be given greater
weight than othet: factors used by courts faced with the issue
of likelihood of confusion.

c.

LACK OF ACTUAL CONFUSION CASES

While proof of actual confusion in the past and/or in the present is the best method of proving likelihood of confusion in the
future, some courts make an additional assertion: a lack of actual confusion is proof that no likelihood of confusion exists. 93 This
rule is applied under either of two conditions: (1) the party or
parties are giant corporations with the ability to conduct surveys or have record keeping systems that will retain anecdotal evidence of actual confusion94 or (2) the two marks have been
concurrently used for a significant period of time without
actual confusion occurring. 96
115; Annotation, Admissibility, supra note 21, at 23. In general, a survey must be fair
and scientifically conducted by qualified experts and impartial interviewers, responses
should be drawn from a sample ofa relevant portion of potential consumers, survey questions should not mislead or show a bias for one product over another, and responses should
be recorded in an unbiased manner. Note that a flawed survey may be inadmissible, but
flaws often only affect the weight to be given the survey after admission. [d.
92. See Exxon Corporation v. Texas Motor Exchange of Houston, 528 F.2d 500, 507,
208 U.S.P.Q. 384,390 (5th Cir. 1980) (15% of people surveyed associated infringing mark
"TEXON" with senior user's "EXXON".); Evans and Gunn, Trademark Survey Euidence,
supra note 88, at 22. The commentators in this article assert that there exists an "emerging national consensus that a showing often percent or more is sufficient to establish
likelihood of confusion. -; Cf. Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 725 F. Supp
790, 797, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1124, 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), amen.d. den.ied, 729 F. Supp.
790, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 904 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1990) (28% of survey respondents associated infringing mark "ENERGIZER" on gloves with the plaintiffs registered mark "SHEER ENERGY" on pantyhose.).
93. Falcon Rice Mill v. Community Rice Mill, 725 F.2d 336, 347-48, 222 U.S.P.Q.
197,205 (5th Cir. 1984); See McGregorDoniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126,1136,
202 U.S.P.Q. 81, 91 (2nd Cir. 1979), affg, 446 F. Supp. 160,199 U.S.P.Q. 466 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); See also American Optical Corp. v. American Olean Tile Co., Inc., 185 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 405, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
94. American Optical Corp., 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 410.
95. McGregor-Doniger Inc., 599 F.2d at 1136 n.6, 202 U.S.P.Q. at 91 n.6.
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These decisions reemphasize the growing role that courts
have been giving to actual confusion. However, they still do not
admit expressly that this is the approach taken.
Iv.

ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADEMARK LAW

The final rationale that justifies the assertion that courts
emphasize actual confusion when analyzing a likelihood of
confusion issue grows from two developments in the trademark
field. First, judicial interpretation of language in trademark
statutes places greater importance on actual confusion. Second,
trademark law became an independent field of law, suggesting
that it is moving away from tort doctrines.
A.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF TRADEMARK STATUTES

According to Resource Developers, Inc. v. The Statue of
Liberty-Ellis Island Foundation, Inc.,s6 a plaintiff seeking
damages under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,s7 must prove
that actual confusion exists. 98 By putting this gloss on the
statutory language, Resource Developers gave more support to
the use of this element as the key element in infringement disputes. The court not only emphasized actual confusion, it
made it a prerequisite to recovery.
B.

TRADEMARK LAW AND TORT DOCTRINES

The American Law Institute drafted the Restatement
Second of Torts without the sections defining confusing similarity found in the First Restatement. 99 The Restatement
authors noted that confusion of source had developed into a substantial specialty "governed extensively by legislation and
largely divorced from [its] initial grounding in the principles
oftorts."IOO The Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition
now contains the equivalent sections. 101
96. 926 F.2d 134, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1842 (2nd Cir. 1991).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988).
98. Resource Developers, 926 F.2d at 139, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1845; See PPX
Enterprises, Inc. v. Audiofidelity Enterprises, Inc., 818 F.2d 266, 271-72, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
1672, 1675 (2d Cir. 1987); Warner Brothers, Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 79,
211 U.S.P.Q. 1017, 1019 (2d Cir. 1981), affd, 724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, DIV. IX, Introduction (1978).
100. Id.
101. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw, UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 9-37 (Tent. Draft No.2,
1991 & Tent. Draft No.3, 1991).
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The signal sent by the Restatement authors is that tort
principles should have a diminished impact on trademark law. 102
Thus courts should not be obligated to weigh actual confusion
equally with the other elements oflikelihood of confusion merely because the Restatement advanced this view in the past.

V.

CONCLUSION

Acknowledging that actual confusion is the most important
of the likelihood of confusion elements is an exercise in making explicit that which is implicit through practice; it is not a
call for the restructuring of trademark law. The federal courts
have recognized actual confusion's value as the best evidence
of the harm that trademark law tries to prevent: the likelihood
of confusion.
The availability of anecdotal evidence and surveys of actual confusion shows that proof of such confusion is not hard to find.
Likewise, the use of equitable relief can alleviate the concern that
emphasizing actual confusion will lead to irreparable harm.
Actual confusion must be proven in order to receive damages under the federal trademark laws. Finally, the
Restatement authors, who originated the likelihood of confusion elements, have noted that trademark law has transgressed its tort law roots.
The court's analysis of infringement need take only one
more step: to explicitly acknowledge that actual confusion is the
dispositive element in deciding such controversies. This would
provide guidance to current and future mark holders because
they would know exactly what evidence is necessary to protect
their marks.
Likewise, judicial economy would be promoted if courts
clearly relied on actual confusion. Mark users would be encouraged to use the federal registration process in order to establish a lack of confusion early in a mark's use. As more marks
are registered, more notice is given to future mark holders as
to what marks are taken. Thus, they can avoid using marks
that clearly would cause confusion and lead to expensive and
time consuming litigation.
Edwin S. Clark*
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